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ENCOURAGING PRICE COMPETITION AMONG
NEW JERSEY’S RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE BROKERS:
REFORMS TO PROMOTE THE GROWTH OF ALTERNATIVE
BROKERAGES AND REDUCE TRANSACTION COSTS
Bradford W. Muller ∗
I.

INTRODUCTION

The legal and regulatory environment in New Jersey must be
1
changed to encourage price competition among residential real es2
tate brokers, which will in turn lower transaction costs for both buyers and sellers. Alternative brokerages, such as those with discount,
flat-fee, or fee-for-service business models, are the key to driving in3
creased price competition among the state’s traditional brokerages.
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1
Professor Deardorff defines price competition as “[c]ompetition among firms
by reducing price, as opposed to by changing characteristics of the product.” ALAN
V. DEARDORFF, TERMS OF TRADE: GLOSSARY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 214 (2006),
available at http://www-personal.umich.edu/~alandear/glossary/p.html. In that regard, when this Comment refers to price competition, it is referring to the price of
brokers’ commissions.
2
“Real estate brokers are licensed professionals who help sellers and prospective
buyers of homes, and are often part of a brokerage firm or franchise.” Press Release,
Fed. Trade Comm’n, Buying a Home: It’s a Big Deal (May 2007), available at
http://ftc.gov/bc/edu/pubs/consumer/alerts/zalt001.pdf; see also N.J. STAT. ANN. §
45:15-3 (West Supp. 2007) (New Jersey’s definition of a real estate broker).
3
FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION IN THE REAL ESTATE
BROKERAGE INDUSTRY 37 (2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/realestate
/V050015.pdf [hereinafter FTC / DOJ] (“Some commenters identified discount and
fee-for-service brokers as key drivers of price competition. One agent claimed that,
due to the prevalence of discount brokers, real estate agents ‘are confronted with the
question how much can you reduce your commission? It is a standard question
now.’”).
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4

New Jersey’s rebate ban makes it difficult for these alternative bro5
kerages to enter and succeed in the state’s market. This law, along
with a lack of proactive state action to combat the anticompetitive
6
practice of “steering,” has created a legal and regulatory framework
that disfavors alternative brokerages, and thereby reduces price com7
petition while increasing transaction costs for the consumer.
This Comment does not seek to explore what brokers should
earn based upon services provided, but rather stands for the proposition that price competition is in the public’s best interest. To encourage price competition, alternative business models should be allowed to compete vigorously within New Jersey without having to face
unnecessary statutory constraints and enforcement problems that
limit their ability to survive.
8
New Jersey’s courts have long recognized a public trust placed
in residential real estate brokers (brokers). These decisions show
that the courts view the residential real estate industry as being “af9
fected with a public interest” in which brokers are held to higher du-

4

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:15-17(k) (West Supp. 2007) (preventing brokers from rebating a portion of their commission to the buyer or seller).
5
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) defines alternative brokerages as “those
brokerage firms whose business practices differ substantially from the norm in either
commission rate or in type, level, or variety of service offered.” FED. TRADE COMM’N,
STAFF REPORTS, THE RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE BROKERAGE INDUSTRY: LOS ANGELES
REGIONAL OFFICE STAFF REPORT VOLUMES I AND II AND THE BUTTERS REPORT 20 (1983),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/realestate/workshop/index.htm (scroll to bottom
of webpage, and then use hyperlinks to access PDF versions of the report) [hereinafter FTC 1983].
6
For a definition of steering, see FTC / DOJ, supra note 3, at 68 (“Steering refers
to any action taken by a broker or agent to avoid cooperating with a particular competitor.”). The form of steering discussed in this Comment is based on economic
and competitive factors, as opposed to the racial steering discussed in Havens Realty
Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982).
7
See generally Norman W. Hawker, Competition in the Residential Real Estate
Brokerage Industry: A Summary of the AAI Symposium (Fall 2006),
http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/archives/files/535.pdf.
8
Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 236 A.2d 843, 856 (N.J. 1967) (“There can be
no doubt that the business of the real estate broker is affected with a public interest.
The Legislature has marked it off as distinct from occupations which are pursued of
common right without regulation or restriction.”) (citation omitted) (emphasis
added); Coldwell Banker Residential Real Estate Servs., Inc. v. N.J. Real Estate
Comm’n, 576 A.2d 938, 941 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) (“The occupation of a
real estate broker is permeated by considerations of public policy.”) (emphasis added);
Grillo v. Bd. of REALTORS of the Plainfield Area, 219 A.2d 635, 643 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. 1966) (“[I]n addition to the public concern with monopolistic practices,
there is a specific public interest in the real estate business—shown by the scheme of
regulation provided by statute . . . .”) (emphasis added).
9
Ellsworth Dobbs, 236 A.2d at 856.
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10

ties as fiduciaries. Better enforcement is needed to ensure that brokers fulfill those fiduciary duties, namely by putting the interests of
their clients above their own.
New Jersey courts have also shown that they value competition
11
among brokers. In Grillo v. Board of REALTORS of the Plainfield Area,
the Superior Court found that the best form of competition involves
a variety of competitors: “It has been recognized that effective or
workable competition requires ‘the presence in the market of several
sellers, each of them possessing the capacity to survive and grow, and
the preservation of conditions which keep alive the threat of poten12
tial competition from others.’”
The Grillo court’s logic is also shared by economists, regulators,
and interest groups who expound the benefits of a market containing
13
many different competing brokers with diverse business models.
10

Id. (“The broker was and is looked upon as a fiduciary and is required to exercise fidelity, good faith and primary devotion to the interests of his principal.”) (citation
omitted) (emphasis added).
11
The concept of competition as a public good is seen in the Grillo and Oates decisions: “It is the policy of the common law to encourage competition.” Grillo, 219
A.2d at 644 (citation omitted). “The lessening of competition—a public evil—is incontrovertibly present.” Oates v. E. Bergen County Multiple Listing Serv., Inc., 273
A.2d 795, 803 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1971).
12
Grillo, 219 A.2d at 647 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
13
“From an economist’s perspective, the more different types of folks who might
get to share [real estate] listings, the more likely it is that the consumers are likely to
be presented with a wide array of choices.” Dr. Robert Hahn, Executive Dir. of the
Am. Enter. Inst.-Brookings Joint Ctr., Statement at Competition Policy and the Real
Estate Industry: A Public Workshop Hosted by the Federal Trade Commission and
Department of Justice 32 (2005), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/workshops/
comprealestate/051209transcript.pdf [hereinafter Workshop]. “It’s a complicated
market . . . but that’s all the more reason to have different competitive models out
there and different kinds of services being offered to the consumer.” Id. at 49.
The Progressive Policy Institute, a Washington think tank, has estimated that these newer internet-based business models could save consumers close to half of that $60 billion currently spent on real estate
commissions. If that’s true, or if it’s even partially true, that would represent a huge savings obviously to consumers.
Id. at 136 (Jon Leibowitz, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Statement). Regarding
those consumers who wish to pay less in exchange for limited services:
New business models offering unbundled real estate services have
been created to fill this demand. In areas where barriers to this business model have not been created consumers who are experienced in
real estate transactions . . . as well as other consumers who take the
time to understand the process, have saved substantial amounts on real
estate sales transactions.
....
[A]HGA believes that were there no barriers to new business models
their penetration would be much greater and the average commission
today would be much lower.
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Based upon these principles, New Jersey must change its statutory
and regulatory structure and the methods by which those laws and
rules are enforced to give alternative brokerages the “capacity to survive and grow,” and to help create the “conditions which keep alive
14
the threat of potential competition from others.” By doing so, the
state can put price pressures on traditional brokerages and reduce
transaction costs for New Jersey’s buyers and sellers.
In an effort to spur effective legal and regulatory change, in Part
II this Comment provides a background of the current state of New
Jersey’s residential real estate market. This involves analyzing the
various brokerage business models already present in the state and
the business models of those brokerages that are prevented from entering New Jersey because of its rebate ban. Part II also describes the
general lack of price competition in the residential real estate industry. In Part III, this Comment supports A373, an Assembly bill aimed
15
at repealing New Jersey’s rebate ban. Part III discusses the arguments both for and against rebates, New Jersey’s rationale for its rebate ban, and why the ban must be repealed. Finally, in Part IV this
Comment suggests a framework to combat steering. Part IV discusses
the legal and ethical problems with steering, along with the code and
enforcement changes that the state should make to reduce the effects
of steering while fostering increased price competition among resi16
dential brokers.
II. THE GROWTH OF ALTERNATIVE BROKERAGES IN NEW JERSEY MUST
BE PROMOTED TO COMBAT THE GENERAL LACK OF PRICE COMPETITION
New Jersey has many different kinds of brokerages present in the
state and many which have yet to enter. There are four major varieties of brokers in New Jersey: traditional, full service discount, flat-fee
17
Multiple Listing Service (MLS) access, and fee-for-service. Some of
Comments of the American Homeowners Grassroots Alliance, submitted to the U.S.
Fed. Trade Comm’n and the U.S. Dep’t of Justice for the Public Workshop on Competition Policy and the Real Estate Indus. (Oct. 25, 2005), available at http://www.
americanhomeowners.org/AHGA/DoJ-FTC10-25-05.htm [hereinafter AHGA].
14
Grillo, 219 A.2d at 647 (citation omitted).
15
Gen. Assem. 373, 213th Leg., 2008–2009 Leg. Sess. (N.J. 2008) (A373 was first
introduced in the 2006–2007 legislative session as A3567).
16
The analysis within this Comment is meant to apply statewide, despite the differences in closing procedures in northern and southern New Jersey. Also, the question of what constitutes a fair wage for a broker’s services is beyond the scope of this
Comment.
17
For a description of the MLS, see Grillo, 219 A.2d at 644. See also AHGA, supra
note 13 (“The MLS is an electronic database of information about the homes of the
fiduciaries of participating brokers. Most [MLS databases] are owned and governed
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the firms not currently operating within the state employ a rebatebased business model. The New Jersey market is rich in real estate
professionals. According to the New Jersey Real Estate Commission
18
(NJREC), as of July 31, 2006, there were 88,126 real estate salespersons, 7940 broker salespersons, and 3743 brokers of record in the
19
state. Over 57,000 of those agents are members of the New Jersey
20
Association of REALTORS® (NJAR®), a trade organization which
falls under the auspices of the National Association of REALTORS®
21
(NAR®).
A. Alternative Brokerages in New Jersey
A key to price competition in the residential real estate industry
22
is the growth and survival of alternative brokerages. This Comment
focuses on three of the business models employed by New Jersey’s alternative brokerages: full-service discount, flat-fee MLS access, and
fee-for-service. Changes are needed to allow alternatives brokerages
to better compete in New Jersey and to encourage those not yet in
the state to enter the market.
Before delving into the alternative brokerage industry, it is important to understand the role of “traditional” brokers. Traditional
23
Tradibrokerages dominate the marketplace across the country.
by those brokers . . . [M]ost MLS’s [sic] now also feed partial MLS listing information
to the consumer-facing websites of participating brokers.”).
18
NJ Real Estate Commission, http://www.state.nj.us/dobi/division_rec/index.
htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2008) (stating that the NJREC was formed to “administer
and enforce” the state’s real estate licensing law, issue licenses, and establish “standards of practice” for the profession).
19
NJ
Real
Estate
Commission:
Licensing
and
Education,
http://www.state.nj.us/dobi/division_rec/licensing/reclic_menu.htm (last visited
Nov. 1, 2008).
20
NJAR®
Press
Kit,
Frequently
Asked
Questions,
http://www.njar.com/pressroom/presskit/FAQs.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2008); see
generally New Jersey Association of REALTORS®, http://www.njar.com (last visited
Nov. 1, 2008).
21
NAR®, http://www.realtor.org (last visited Dec. 30, 2007); see generally About
REALTORS®, http://www.realtor.org/realtororg.nsf/pages/AboutREALTORS?Op
enDocument (last visited Nov. 1, 2008) (the REALTOR® designation is given to brokers who are members of NAR and follow its Code of Ethics).
22
FTC / DOJ, supra note 3, at 37. For a definition of alternative brokerages, see
FTC 1983, supra note 5.
23
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT TO THE H. COMM. ON FIN. SERVS.,
H. R., REAL ESTATE BROKERAGE, FACTORS THAT MAY AFFECT PRICE COMPETITION 12 n.21
(2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05947.pdf [hereinafter GAO]
(“Consultants to NAR estimated that discount, full-service brokerages, Internetoriented full-service brokerages, broker referral services, and other nontraditional
brokerage models collectively represented buyers and sellers in less than 2 percent of
all real estate brokerage transactions in 2003.”).
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tional brokers are those who charge the “going rate” for commis24
25
sion and offer a full range of services. Some examples of traditional brokerages in New Jersey are Prudential Real Estate, Coldwell
Banker Real Estate LLC, Weichert Realtors®, Diane Turton Realtors®, The Mary Holder Agency, GMAC Real Estate, Sotheby’s Inter26
27
national Realty, and hoards of independent brokerages.
The first variety of alternative brokerages is the full-service discount firms which compete on price by offering full service at a re28
duced commission. In New Jersey, a few brokerages utilize different
29
variations of the full-service discount model, including Assist-2-Sell

24

See id. at 10 (average commission rates stand at approximately 5.1%).
Those services include, on the seller side, helping to determine the appropriate list price for the home, placing the listing in MLS, advertising the home, offering
open houses, showing the home and arranging appointments for other brokers to
show the home, procuring offers and aiding in the negotiation process, and helping
to get the deal to closing. PATRICK WOODALL & STEPHEN BROBECK, CONSUMER FED’N
OF AM., NONTRADITIONAL REAL ESTATE BROKERS: GROWTH AND CHALLENGES 3 (2006),
available at http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/Nontraditonal_Real_Estate_BrokersGrowth_and_Challenges.pdf. On the buyer side, the traditional broker helps the
buyer select which properties are appropriate for the buyer based upon price and
features, shows the properties, drafts the contract, negotiates the sale price, and assists the buyer in getting the deal to closing by recommending inspectors. Id.; see
William C. Erxleben, In Search of Price and Service Competition in Residential Real Estate
Brokerage: Breaking the Cartel, 56 WASH. L. REV. 179, 182 (1981); Lawrence J. White, The
Residential Real Estate Brokerage Industry: What Would More Vigorous Competition Look
Like?, 35 REAL EST. L.J. 11, 13 n.6 (2006).
26
Find Real Estate, http://www.prudentialproperties.com (last visited Nov. 1,
2008); Coldwell Banker Real Estate LLC, http://www.coldwellbanker.com (last visited Nov. 1, 2008); Weichert.com, http://www.weichert.com (last visited Nov. 1,
2008); Welcome to Your New Jersey Florida Real Estate Connection,
http://www.dianeturton.com/customization/dtr/newsite (last visited Nov. 5, 2008);
A Tradition of Success, http://www.maryholder.com/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2007);
GMAC Real Estate, http://www.gmacrealestate.com/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2008);
Luxury Real Estate & Homes for Sale, http://www.sothebysrealty.com (last visited
Nov. 1, 2008).
27
In one small Monmouth County town alone—Atlantic Highlands—as recently
as late 2008 there were four independent brokerages (Britton Real Estate LLC,
Lesher Associates, Maddalena Realty LLC, and Raymond Passaro Realtors®). The
economic slow-down has caused that number to dwindle to two in 2009.
28
GAO, supra note 23, at 5.
29
Assist-2-Sell is a discount/fee-for-service hybrid with six New Jersey offices. Assist-2-Sell, http://www.assist2sell.com/Default.aspx (follow “Find an Office” hyperlink; click on “NJ” icon) (last visited Nov. 5, 2008). It offers a menu of service programs with a sliding scale for commissions. Information for Home Sellers,
http://www.assist2sell.com/Default.aspx (follow “Find an Office” hyperlink; click on
“Selling a Home”) (last visited Nov. 5, 2008). These services include a paperwork
only “flat fee” fee-for-service component where no listing contract is required, a “Direct to Buyers” office-exclusive program, and their discounted full-service package,
“MLS for less.” Id.
25
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30

and Cara Realtors®. Foxtons—a former giant in the New Jersey full31
32
service discount market —recently declared bankruptcy, leaving a
large void in this segment of the industry.
Next, the flat-fee business model, in which sellers are charged a
small flat-fee for access into the MLS system, provides a minimum
level of services, such as compiling a listing, taking pictures of the
33
home, and providing a lockbox and flyers. Examples of flat-fee MLS
34
access firms operating in New Jersey are Realmart Realty, ForSale35
ByOwner.com, and Fsbonj.com.
Another popular alternative brokerage business model in New
Jersey is fee-for-service. These brokerages compete on price by offer36
ing an à la carte menu of services. Fees are thus based on services
30

Cara Realtors® offers full service listings at 3.9%. Cara Realtors, http://www.
cararealtors.com/aboutus.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2008). It is an independent brokerage with one office in Point Pleasant Beach. Cara Realtors—Point Pleasant Beach
NJ Real Estate, http://www.cararealtors.com/contactUs.html (last visited Nov. 5,
2008).
31
Foxtons was a full service discount firm that offered to list properties at commissions as low as two percent. James T. Prior, Cohen’s yhd Foxtons Offers Realty Reality,
BNET, Dec. 1, 2002, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa5311/is_
200212/ai_n21321492. Its North American corporate headquarters was located in
West Long Branch. Id. Foxton’s agents were on salary rather than paid via commission, and they had an extensive support staff to handle different aspects of the transaction. Id.
32
Michael L. Diamond, Foxtons’ Debts Top $40 Million, ASBURY PARK PRESS (Neptune, N.J.), Oct. 9, 2007, at A1.
33
Get Your Flat Fee MLS Real Estate Listing in New Jersey (NJ) with no listing
commission, http://www.flatfeemlsdirect.com (last visited Nov. 5, 2008).
34
Realmart Realty, the local agent for flatfeemlsdirect.com, offers a $395 flat-fee
MLS listing. Id. The seller may also pay $495 for a “showcase” listing. Id. The seller
receives an MLS listing, photos of the home, a lockbox, forms, yard signs, and house
flyers. Flat Fee MLS NJ, http://www.flatfeemlsdirect.com/selling_plans.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2008). The seller takes all calls for availability, appointments, and questions.
FAQ about MLS listing, FSBO, selling and buying agents,
http://www.flatfeemlsdirect.com/faq.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2008). The listing
agent reviews the contract. Id. The flat fee goes to Realmart and the seller pays a
normal commission to the cooperating broker (generally two to three percent of the
sale price). Id. According to their broker, Realmart Realty averages 200 listings per
month, and often times the owners of these properties are sales associates from traditional brokerages looking to save on commission. Telephone Interview with Gary
Ragusa, Broker/Owner, Realmart Realty, in Highlands, N.J. (Aug. 10, 2007) [hereinafter Ragusa Interview].
35
FSBO: For Sale By Owner-FAQs, http://www.forsalebyowner.com/help.html?
clickID=topNav (last visited Nov. 5, 2008); FSBONJ.com-For Sale By Owner NJ,
http://www.fsbonj.com (last visited Nov. 5, 2008).
36
Workshop, supra note 13, at 8–9 (Deborah Platt Majoras, Chairman of the Fed.
Trade Comm’n, Statement); see GAO, supra note 23, at 5; Erin Johansen, Help-U-Sell
Gains Converts, DENV. BUS. J., Apr. 30, 2004, available at http://denver.biz
journals.com/denver/stories/2004/05/03/newscolumn2.html?page=3 (“This fee-

MULLER (FINAL)

672

4/6/2009 11:20:59 PM

[Vol. 39:665

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW
37

provided rather than on a percentage of the sale price. Two exam38
ples of fee-for-service brokerages in New Jersey are Help-U-Sell and
39
Real Estate Consultants.
B. Alternative Brokerages Not Present in New Jersey
Some growing alternative brokerages have yet to enter New Jer40
41
sey, such as Redfin and Buyside Realty. Both of these brokerages
use a rebate-based business model, which involves the broker returning a portion of his commission to the client, resulting in substantial
42
cost savings for the buyer or seller. Because of the state’s current
for-service concept is different than discount brokers who simply decrease their
commission rate but don’t give sellers the option to handle parts of the process on
their own.”).
37
The logic behind this method of pricing is best described in the following
quote from a broker on the Jersey Shore:
I ask people “If you were to bring a 10 year old economy car and a
brand new luxury car to be washed, what do you think you would pay?”
Well, the same of course because the cost of the wash has nothing to do
with the value [of] the car. The same is true in real estate and I just reflect that.
E-mail from Daniel Desmond, Broker / Owner of Help-U-Sell Bay Beach Realty, to
Bradford W. Muller (Aug. 10, 2007, 05:04 EST) (on file with author).
38
Help-U-Sell Real Estate, http://www.helpusell.com (last visited Nov. 5, 2008).
Help-U-Sell has four New Jersey offices. Office Locator, http://www.helpusell.
com/office_locator_map.asp?state=NJ (last visited Nov. 5, 2008). It applies fees for
each individual service that the seller wants, including showing the home and running an open house.
Help-U-Sell Real Estate: Save The Help-U-Sell Way,
http://www.helpusell.com/sellers_save.shtml (last visited Nov. 5, 2008); see Johansen,
supra note 36.
39
Real Estate Consultants has multiple New Jersey offices. Real Estate Consultants in New Jersey, http://www.recnj.com/contact.cfm (last visited Nov. 5, 2008). It
is a fee-for-service brokerage, offering a menu of plans with increasing commissions
based upon the services provided: 2% Participation Plan, Associate Plan, and MLS
Plan. Id.
40
Damon Darlin, 2 Web Sites Push Further into Services Real Estate Agents Offer, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 8, 2006 at C3 (“Redfin.com, introduced an unusual new service last week.
. . . [T]he feature automates the process of bidding on a house online. . . . [T[hen it
rebates to the buyer two-thirds of the buyer’s agent’s commission . . . .”).
41
Buyside Realty, http://www.buysiderealty.com (last visited Nov. 5, 2008).
Buyside Realty offers sixty-six percent commission rebates to their buyers. Id. Steve
Otis, Buyside’s General Counsel, says that this saves the average buyer $11,000.
Telephone Interview with Steve Otis, General Counsel, Buyside Realty (Sept. 4, 2007)
[hereinafter Otis Interview].
42
Glenn Kelman, the president and CEO of Redfin noted:
We’ve refunded over $3 million in commissions to our customers . . .
[w]hen we’re the buyer’s agent, we take our commission, which is usually three percent. We keep one-third of it. And we give two-thirds of it
back to the buyer. So, on a $1 million house, we would get $30,000
normally. But we only keep $10,000 and give $20,000 back to the
buyer.
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ban on rebates, these brokerages are precluded from entering New
43
Jersey without drastically changing their approach. Altering their
respective business models could severely hurt these companies’ abil44
ity to succeed within the state.
45
ZipRealty —an internet-based real estate brokerage with the
same basic rebate approach as Redfin and Buyside Realty—has been
forced to change its business model to comply with New Jersey’s rebate ban. Now instead of offering rebates to New Jersey’s consumers,
ZipRealty offers to make a donation to the buyer’s charity of choice
46
equivalent to twenty percent of their commission. The lack of success this commission-donation inducement is having as compared to
a pure buyer-rebate is evidenced by ZipRealty’s ardent support for
47
the elimination of New Jersey’s rebate ban.
C. Competition in the Residential Real Estate Industry Is Focused on
Non-Price Dimensions, as Traditional Brokerages Stifle Price
Competition
Generally, despite the existence of alternative brokerages, there
48
49
is a lack of price competition in the residential real estate industry.

CBS News: Chipping Away at Realtors’ Six Percent (CBS television broadcast May 13,
2007), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/05/11/60minutes/print
able2790865.shtml.
43
Posting of JanelleS to Redfin Real Estate Forums, http://forums.redfin.
com/rf/board/message?board.id=SiteQuestions&thread.id=57 (Aug. 22, 2007, 15:32
EST) (“FYI, there are 11 states that do not allow rebates, therefore Redfin cannot set
up shop with our current business model of rebating 2/3rd of the commission back
to the buyers[.]”). Redfin has not yet assessed how it would change its business
model to conform to New Jersey’s rebate ban should it decide to enter New Jersey.
E-mail from Cynthia Pang, Senior Communications Manager, Redfin Corporation, to
Bradford W. Muller (Aug. 30, 2007, 13:27 EST) (on file with author); see infra note
44.
44
Mr. Otis stated that if Buyside decides to enter New Jersey, it will not be as successful in the state because it would have to drastically change its business model to
conform to the rebate ban. Otis Interview, supra note 41.
45
ZipRealty Real Estate, Homes for Sale, MLS Listings, Real Estate Agents,
http://www.ziprealty.com/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2008).
46
ZipRealty Real Estate—Buy a home and get 20% of our commission back!,
http://www.ziprealty.com/buy_a_home/rebate.jsp?donate= (last visited Nov. 5.
2008).
47
At the February 6, 2007, hearing before the NJREC on A3567 (currently
A373)—the Assembly bill that would repeal New Jersey’s rebate ban—Patrick Lashinsky, President of ZipRealty, was the lead presenter and laid out his company’s case
for allowing rebates. Presentation by ZipRealty and Discussion on Assembly Bill A-3567:
Hearing on A-3567 Before the N. J. Real Estate Comm’n of the Dep’t of Banking and Ins. (N.J.
2007) [hereinafter Presentation].
48
Deardorff, supra note 1.
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The focus of brokers’ efforts to procure customers instead lies mostly
50
in non-price competition. Thus, rather than attracting clients by offering lower commissions, and therein reducing consumers’ transaction costs, brokers instead focus on such non-price competition as increased advertising, drawing more agents to the brokerage to
increase sales volume, offering a larger variety of services, and other
51
measures. Sometimes, this non-price competition is wasteful, result52
ing in services being offered that consumers do not want or need.
A major reason for the focus on non-price competition is that alternative brokerages are often punished by their fellow brokers for at53
Traditempting to compete on price via reduced commissions.
tional brokerages levy punishment by disparaging the alternative
broker, directly soliciting the alternative broker’s current clients, and
54
steering their buyers away from the alternative broker’s listings. In
New Jersey, steering from traditional brokers and the rebate ban
makes running a profitable business difficult for alternative brokerages and therefore discourages price competition.
III. THE REBATE BAN IS A MAJOR IMPEDIMENT TO PRICE COMPETITION
IN NEW JERSEY AND MUST BE REPEALED
In the majority of states, brokers are allowed to rebate a portion
55
of their commission to their clients at closing.
A rebate lowers
49

FTC 1983, supra note 5, at 42 (“While price competition generally is not considered a useful method of competing in this industry, non-price competition for an
increased share of the business being done in the market is intense.”).
50
Id.; FTC / DOJ, supra note 3, at 47 (“Hsieh provided empirical evidence at the
Workshop consistent with competition in the brokerage industry occurring primarily
in non-price dimensions.”).
51
GAO, supra note 23, at 11.
52
See GAO, supra note 23, at 11 (“Although some of [the non-price competition]
can benefit consumers, some economic literature suggest that such actions lead to
inefficiency because brokerage services could be provided by fewer agents or at a
lower cost.”); Workshop, supra note 13, at 246 (Dr. Chang-Tai Hsieh, Assoc. Professor
of Economics at the Univ. of California, Statement) (“[I]t’s clear there’s an enormous amount of competition in the real estate brokerage business, but what we
should try to do is think of ways in which competition translates into lower prices,
higher quality of service, not into this kind of waste.”) (emphasis added).
53
Michael K. Braswell & Stephen L. Poe, The Residential Real Estate Brokerage Industry: A Proposal for Reform, 30 AM. BUS. L.J. 271, 315, 317 (1992).
54
Id.; Ragusa Interview, supra note 34 (Mr. Ragusa claims to have been the victim
of blatant steering and disparaging remarks by fellow brokers).
55
DOJ/Antitrust: Rebates Make Buying a Home Less Expensive,
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/real_estate/rebates.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2008)
[hereinafter DOJ/Antitrust]. Rebates are currently prohibited in twelve states:
Alaska, Alabama, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Tennessee. Id. Additionally, “Iowa prohibits
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transaction costs and encourages price competition among brokers,
56
especially those representing buyers. In fact, rebates appear to be
57
one of the only viable ways to achieve buyer-side price competition.
Therefore, to promote both increased price competition and cost savings for the state’s consumers, New Jersey’s Legislature must repeal
its rebate ban.
A. Both Public and Private Groups Have Presented Strong Arguments
in Favor of Allowing Rebates
In a letter to the Speaker of the Tennessee House of Representatives—in an attempt to prevent Tennessee from passing a rebate ban
similar to New Jersey’s—the Department of Justice (DOJ) outlined its
argument for allowing rebates:
The structure of the typical real estate contract makes brokers’
freedom to offer rebates important. As you know, the seller and
seller’s broker typically agree on the rate of the commission to be
paid and how the commission is allocated between the seller’s
and buyer’s brokers. As a result, there is no opportunity for the
buyer to negotiate with his or her broker for a lower commission
rate.... Rebates are important under this typical structure because they often present the only viable way for a buyer’s broker to compete for business
on the basis of price. If the buyer’s broker were simply to reduce his
or her share of the joint commission, the savings would go directly to the seller’s broker, not to the home buyer or the home
seller. Thus, lowering the commission does not bring the buyer’s
broker more business or save his customers money. Rebates, in
contrast, go directly to the buyer or the seller, and are powerful tools for
58
competition among brokers.

rebates when the consumers use the services of two or more real estate brokers during a transaction.” Id.
56
Workshop, supra note 13, at 155 (Philip Henderson, Vice President of Lending
Tree, LLC, Statement) (“If a broker wishes to use price competition . . . it’s very difficult for the buyer side to do that, because the custom in the industry . . . is for the
seller’s broker to split its commission with the buyer’s broker. . . . but a rebate helps to
facilitate that price competition . . . .”) (emphasis added).
57
GAO, supra note 23, at 15 (“Proponents also note that offering a rebate is one
of the few ways to reduce the effective price of buyer brokerage services since commissions are typically paid wholly by the seller.”); FTC 1983, supra note 5, at 105
(“Rebating is a form of price competition that is used by a number of alternative
brokers. [Rebating] may be the only practicable method by which price competition can reach
the buyer’s end of the transaction.”) (emphasis added).
58
Letter from John R. Read, Chief, Litigation III, U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division, to James O. Naifeh, Speaker of the House, Tennessee House of Representatives (May 12, 2007) (emphasis added), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr
/public/comments/223252.htm.

MULLER (FINAL)

676

4/6/2009 11:20:59 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:665

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has also been a proponent of rebates, dating back to their heavily cited 1983 report on the
59
residential real estate industry. The FTC laid out the potential cost
60
benefits of allowing rebates in its most recent report. As an example, the FTC stated that a broker who rebates a third of his commission to his client creates overall commission savings of approximately
61
sixteen percent on the total transaction.
The American Antitrust Institute and the now-defunct American
Enterprise Institute–Brookings Joint Center have been the standard
62
bearers among private groups advocating for an end to rebate bans.
Meanwhile, even some major traditional brokerages have come out in
63
favor of rebates, including Cendant, the former parent company of
Century 21, Coldwell Banker, Coldwell Banker Commercial, ERA and
64
Another proponent of rebates is
Sotheby’s International Realty.
65
Prudential Fox & Roach, whose Senior Vice President spoke before
59

FTC 1983, supra note 5, at 105.
FTC / DOJ, supra note 3, at 50.
61
Id.
62
AEI-Brookings Joint Center, http://aei-brookings.org/publications/index.
php?tab=topics&topicid=83 (last visited Nov. 5, 2008); American Antitrust Institute,
http://www.antitrustinstitute.org (last visited Nov. 5, 2008); see Robert W. Hahn,
Robert E. Litan & Jesse Gurman, Bringing More Competition To Real Estate Brokerage, 35
REAL EST. L.J. 86, 107 (2006) (“We see no compelling economic rationale for not allowing rebates as they represent a form of price competition that should improve efficiency by putting pressure on brokerages to provide better services at lower
prices.”); Hawker, supra note 7, at 18 (“[Commenters] note that commission rebates
to consumers ‘have a positive impact on consumer welfare.’ Even if ‘higher commissions are necessary to ensure the quality of service most customers want; this result,
however, should be determined by consumers and producers via the market,’ rather
than by state laws and regulations.”).
63
Workshop, supra note 13, at 151 (Alex Perriello, President and Chief Executive
Officer of Cendant Real Estate Franchise Group of Cendant Corp., Statement)
(“[S]ome states prohibit all forms of inducement by real estate licensees. . . . Simply
put, we feel that those prohibitions on inducements are not necessary. The remaining anti-inducement states should remove those antiquated laws . . . and stop denying
businesses the opportunity to offer rebates or inducements.”).
64
“These [Cendant] brands have more than 14,400 franchise and companyowned offices and 303,000 brokers and agents worldwide.” Id. at 142 (Lee Quinn,
Attorney with the Antitrust Division, Dep’t of Justice, Statement). Cendant Real Estate is now a company called “Realogy”. Cendant: Main, http://www.cendant.com/
(last visited Mar. 16, 2009).
65
Prudential Fox & Roach is a traditional real estate brokerage, with offices in
Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Delaware. Find a Real Estate Agent or Broker at Prudential Fox & Roach Real Estate, http://www.prufoxroach.com/agentoffice/
index.cfm (last visited Nov. 5, 2008). In total, the company has sixty-five offices and
over 4000 sales agents. Sam Ali, Real Estate Bait: Industry Insiders, Legislature Review
Ban on Closing Gifts, STAR LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), July 15, 2007, at 1 available at
http://www.njar.com/pressroom/pdf/inthenews/071507.pdf.
60
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the NJREC at an April 24, 2007, hearing in favor of a bill that would
66
repeal New Jersey’s rebate ban. Finally, NAR—in its Code of Ethics
and Standards of Practice—does not call the use of rebates unethi67
cal.
B. Arguments Against Rebates Are Based on an Outdated
Paternalistic Approach to Consumer Protection
Despite the clear consumer benefit offered by rebates, a minor68
69
ity of states disallow them, including New Jersey. The initial rationale behind most rebate bans was grounded in consumer protection, as states hoped to “avoid conflicts of interest between agents and
customers by preventing brokers from giving a share of their commission to lawyers, title companies, or others involved in the real estate
70
transaction.” Proponents now argue for a paternalistic approach,
saying that consumers should not be allowed to receive rebates because lifting the bans would expose buyers and sellers to such evils as
“false and misleading offers of rebates” and would undermine their
ability to “choose brokers on the basis of quality of service rather than
71
price.”
One organization that has long supported New Jersey’s rebate
ban, and has only recently become more amenable to the idea of re72
bates, is NJAR®. The arguments provided by NJAR®’s Vice President of Government Affairs are typical of those who advocate against
rebates:
[W]e consider them to be distracting gimmickry . . . . The consumer’s focus will not be on the choice of the firm providing the
real estate brokerage services that best fit the needs of the consumer. The focus will be on who is offering the best rebate . . . .
66

Minutes of the meeting of the N. J. Real Estate Comm’n.: Presentation and Discussion of
New Jersey Association of Realtors/United States Department of Justice/Zip Realty regarding Assembly Bill A3567-Rebate of Commissions 2 (N.J. 2007) [hereinafter April 2007 Minutes].
67
CODE OF ETHICS AND STANDARDS OF PRACTICE OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
REALTORS® Standard of Practice 12-3 (2008), available at http://www.realtor.org/
mempolweb.nsf/pages/printable2008Code (“The offering of premiums, prizes,
merchandise discounts or other inducements . . . is not, in itself, unethical . . . The
offering of any inducements to do business is subject to the limitations and restrictions of state law[.]”) [hereinafter CODE OF ETHICS].
68
DOJ/Antitrust, supra note 55.
69
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:15-17(k) (West Supp. 2007).
70
GAO, supra note 23, at 15 n.30; see Mariwyn Evans, Share the Wealth, REALTOR,
Jan. 1, 2006, available at http://www.realtor.org/rmomag.nsf/pages/lawjan06 (noting that in many states, the intent of the rebate bans was not to stifle price competition, but rather “to prevent kickbacks in real estate transactions”).
71
FTC / DOJ, supra note 3, at 52–53.
72
April 2007 Minutes, supra note 66, at 2.
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NJAR believes consumers should be selecting a real estate professional based on his or her qualifications, services and rapport—
not whether he or she is offering any type of inducements . . .
The focus of the home buying process should be on buying a
73
home.

The Appellate Division explored the rationale behind the state’s
rebate ban in Coldwell Banker Residential Real Estate Services, Inc. v. New
74
Jersey Real Estate Commission.
At the time of Coldwell Banker, the
NJREC had interpreted the rebate ban to prohibit brokers from giving clients rebates through department store coupons or discounted
75
airline tickets. The NJREC’s reasoning for the interpretation was
that these “gimmicks distracted the parties to real estate transactions
from the essentials of the transaction, from what they should be focusing on with respect to the quality of the brokerage service they are
76
going to receive as opposed to any add-ons or pre-offerings.” The
77
Coldwell Banker court upheld that rationale.
The Coldwell Banker decision is less persuasive today because it
78
predated the DOJ’s recent initiative to combat rebate bans. Also, its
73

Ali, supra note 65. For similar arguments from NJAR®, see Glenn Roberts Jr.,
Realtor Group Says No to Consumer Rebates, INMAN NEWS, April 16, 2008, available at http:
//www.inman.com/news/2008/04/16/realtor-group-says-no-consumer-rebates.
74
576 A.2d 938 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990). Although the court did not
reach the question of whether the coupons violated the rebate ban, instead invalidating them based on section 45:15-17(g) of the New Jersey Statute, it did support the
rationale behind the Commission’s claim that the coupons violated the rebate ban.
Id. at 941; N.J. STAT. ANN § 45:15-17(g) (West Supp. 2007).
75
Presentation, supra note 47, at 52–53 (statement of Robert Melillo, NJREC
Comm’r).
76
Id.
As the Commission said; “[u]nsophisticated sellers or buyers or relocating buyers unfamiliar with real estate brokers in a particular area might
choose a Coldwell Banker office based on the [inducement].”
....
Finally, the Commission found that the programs operate ‘as an extraneous inducement to consumers’ to buy or sell through [Coldwell
Banker] for reasons other than the quality of the professional services
of the broker.
Coldwell Banker, 576 A.2d at 940.
77
Coldwell Banker, 576 A.2d at 941 (“Distracting gimmickry creates dangers which
are the legitimate concern of the Legislature and the Commission. . . . Extraneous
inducements . . . can take the buyers’ or sellers’ eyes off the ball.”).
78
See infra notes 80–81 and accompanying text. The DOJ’s Antitrust Division
finds arguments about the potentially harmful effects of rebates unpersuasive: “Some
have argued that refunds and incentives can tempt consumers into closing on real estate transactions against their best interests. The Antitrust Division has found no evidence that refunds and incentives harm consumers. On the contrary, they can dramatically lower the price that consumers pay for brokerage services.” DOJ/Antitrust,
supra note 55.
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reasoning rings hollow when discussing cash rebates, which simply
are “a form of providing the buyer with the same opportunity for a
79
discounted service that the seller now has in New Jersey.” Finally,
both NJAR®’s position and that of the Coldwell Banker court are based
on the false assumption that consumers are unsophisticated, easily
distracted, and unable to make intelligent decisions when faced with
brokerages competing on price.
C. Federal Action Will Be Ineffective in Bringing Rebates to New
Jersey’s Consumers Because of the State Action Immunity Doctrine
The FTC and DOJ have challenged states with rebate bans. The
DOJ has scrutinized and occasionally challenged those limitations
laid down by state real estate commissions, rather than by legislatures,
80
to “bring the benefits of price competition to consumers.” Successful efforts have been mounted in South Dakota, West Virginia, and
81
Kentucky. However, because the New Jersey rebate ban was instituted by the Legislature, it is likely to be “immune from federal anti82
trust enforcement” because of the state action immunity doctrine.

79

Presentation, supra note 47, at 53 (Dennis Casale, Attorney for ZipRealty, Statement).
80
FTC / DOJ, supra note 3, at 50.
81
Id. at 51 (“DOJ also investigated rebate bans by the South Dakota Real Estate
Commission, the West Virginia Real Estate Commission, and the Tennessee Real
Estate Commission. In response to these investigations, the South Dakota and West
Virginia Real Estate Commissions rescinded their regulations prohibiting rebates
. . . .”). In 2005, the DOJ filed an antitrust suit against Kentucky’s Real Estate Commission (KREC) for restricting competition and “caus[ing] consumers to pay higher
prices for real estate brokerage services” as a result of its rebate ban. Id. at 50–51.
The lawsuit was settled a few months later, with the KREC agreeing not to enforce its
rebate ban. Id.
82
Id at 50. For an analysis of the state action immunity doctrine, see FTC OFFICE
OF POLICY PLANNING, REPORT OF THE STATE ACTION TASK FORCE 1 (Sept. 2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/09/stateactionreport.pdf.
The state action doctrine—first articulated in Parker v. Brown—shields
certain anticompetitive conduct from federal antitrust scrutiny when
the conduct is: (1) in furtherance of a clearly articulated state policy,
and (2) actively supervised by the state. . . . Because the state action
doctrine rests on principles of federalism, the doctrine shields sovereign activities of the State itself, including the actions of a state legislature, a governor, or a state supreme court, provided that these entities
are acting in their sovereign capacity under the state constitution. The
doctrine also extends to other, lower level entities—such as state regulatory commissions and licensing boards—provided that these entities
are acting pursuant to a delegation of authority from a governmental
actor with independent, sovereign status.
Id.
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Therefore, any realistic hope for change must come through state
legislation.
D. The State Legislature Should Pass Assembly Bill A373 and Repeal
New Jersey’s Rebate Ban
83

At the state level, A373/S139, a bill co-sponsored by Assemblymen Patrick Diegnan, Paul Moriarty, and Joseph Vas, and State Sena84
85
tor Nicolas Scutari, would repeal New Jersey’s rebate ban. The bill
was discussed before the NJREC at five separate hearings held in 2007
86
and 2008. According to Assemblyman Diegnan, A373 is designed to
eliminate New Jersey’s ban on consumer rebates to help buyers recover a portion of the commission, assisting them with their closing
87
costs and making home buying more feasible. The Assemblyman
explained that his own daughter’s real estate experience—one typical
of the New Jersey middle class—helped drive him to sponsor this bill:
My daughter is a teacher. She makes about $50,000 a year. She
wants to buy herself a condo. She has been able to save about
20,000 for a deposit. The closing costs are what are really killing
her . . . . And I know . . . middle class young people today, are,

83

The Assembly version of the bill, A373, was first introduced in the Assembly as
A3567 and referred to the Assembly’s Regulated Profession and Independent Authorities Committee on Oct. 23, 2006. New Jersey Legislature, http://www.njleg.
state.nj.us/Default.asp (last visited Nov. 5, 2008) (go to “Bill Search”; type “A373” in
the “Bill Number(s)” query box; to see legislative history for A3567, click “A3567”
hyperlink). The bill was again introduced to the Assembly on Jan. 8, 2008 as A373
and was referred to the Regulated Professions Committee. Id. On June 23, 2008, the
bill was transferred to the Consumer Affairs Committee. Id. On Sept. 25, 2008, the
bill was transferred back to the Regulated Professions Committee. Id. The Regulated Professions Committee reported favorably on the bill with amendments on Jan.
15, 2009. Id. The bill passed in the Assembly on Mar. 16, 2009 by a 45-26-7 vote. Id.
The Senate version of the bill, S139, was first introduced in the Senate as S2869 and
referred to the Senate Commerce Committee on Nov. 8, 2007. Id.. The bill was
again introduced in the Senate on Jan. 8, 2008 as S139 and referred to the Commerce Committee. Id.
84
Id.
85
Gen. Assem. 373, 213th Leg., 2008–2009 Leg. Sess. (N.J. 2008), available at
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2008/Bills/A0500/373_I1.PDF.
86
Presentation, supra note 47; April 2007 Minutes, supra note 66; Minutes of the
meeting of the N. J. Real Estate Comm’n.: Discussion Regarding Assembly Bill A-373-Rebate of
Commissions/Zip Realty’s Request 2 (N.J. 2008) [hereinafter April 2008 Minutes]; Minutes of the meeting of the N. J. Real Estate Comm’n.: Discussion Regarding Assembly Bill A373-Rebate of Commissions/Zip Realty’s Request (CONTINUED) 5 (N.J. 2008); Draft Minutes of the meeting of the N.J. Real Estate Comm’n.: Discussion Regarding Assembly Bill A-373Rebate of Commissions/Zip Realty’s Request (CONTINUED) 6 (N.J. 2008).
87
April 2007 Minutes, supra note 66, at 2; Telephone Interview with Patrick Diegnan, Assem. and Sponsor of Assembly Bill 3567, Gen. Assem., in Newark, N.J.
(Aug. 31, 2007).
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many times, out of the housing market not because of [the] down
88
payment, [but] because of closing costs.

Besides Assemblyman Diegnan, a number of individuals spoke
on behalf of the legislation, such as the Senior Vice President of Pru89
dential Fox & Roach, the President of ZipRealty, the Executive Director of the Worldwide ERC Coalition, and attorneys from the
90
DOJ. Even Commissioner Melillo of the NJREC provided an argument in favor of the rebate bill: “I think certainly, there’s [sic] a lot of
seniors who unfortunately are looking to sell in New Jersey because
they can’t afford the carrying costs anymore [and] could probably
91
benefit from a rebate on the commissions.”
With estimates of potential cost savings for New Jersey’s consum92
93
ers ranging from $200 million to $596 million, the benefits of legalizing rebates are simply too great to ignore. Therefore, the Senate
should follow the Assembly’s lead and pass A373 and repeal New Jer94
Whatever limited consumer protection benefits
sey’s rebate ban.
88

Presentation, supra note 47, at 41–42 (statement of Assem. Patrick Diegnan,
Sponsor, Assem. Bill 3567 (currently A373)).
89
Ali, supra note 65, at 7 (“‘Our experience has been that it has been very positive for the consumer’ in Pennsylvania and Delaware, Constantino said. . . . ‘[F]rom
our experience, it also empowers the consumer with more choices and gives them
more flexibility without making them take their eyes off the ball.’”).
90
April 2007 Minutes, supra note 66, at 2.
91
Presentation, supra note 47, at 50–51 (statement of Comm’r Robert Melillo of
the NJREC).
92
The Changing Real Estate Market: Hearing Before the Housing and Community Opportunity Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Financial Servs., 109th Cong. 5 (2006), available at
http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/072506kgb.pdf (statement of Kimberly Gorsuch-Bradbury, Senior Vice President, Real Estate Networks LendingTree,
LLC) (In 2005, “there were approximately 160,000 sales of existing homes in New
Jersey, and the average sales price of these homes was approximately $365,000. At
that sales price, consumers using [LendingTree] could have each received a rebate
of $1,250. Therefore, the potential savings to New Jersey consumers . . . [was] nearly
$200 million . . . .”).
93
Ali, supra note 65 (According to Bennett Matelson, an attorney with DOJ’s Antitrust Division, “[i]f buyers had received [a] 1 percent rebate on the sale of all
154,000 existing homes sold in New Jersey in 2006, buyers would have received over
$596 million in cash[.]”).
94
Although the author supported A373 in its original form, he similarly supports
the amendments to the bill made by the Assembly Regulated Professions Committee
on Jan. 15, 2009. Some of the most important amendments include 1) making rebates available only to buyers of residential real estate; 2) providing that only a real
estate broker, as opposed to individual licensees, can provide rebates; 3) mandating
that the broker and buyer memorialize the rebate at the beginning of the relationship in a written contract; 4) requiring the broker to recommend to the buyer that
he contact a tax professional to discuss any of the potential tax implications caused
by the rebate; 5) requiring that the rebate only be in the form of a credit or check
paid at closing; and 6) mandating that disclosure of the rebate be made to all parties
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the rebate ban may provide do not outweigh the increased price
competition and transaction cost savings that would be spurred by its
repeal.
IV. STEERING IS THE GREATEST IMPEDIMENT TO PRICE COMPETITION
IN THE REAL ESTATE INDUSTRY AND NEW JERSEY MUST COMBAT IT
MORE EFFECTIVELY
The final and perhaps largest impediment to price competition
95
in New Jersey is the anti-competitive practice of steering. Steering
occurs when traditional brokers refuse to show, or navigate interested
clients away from, the listings of alternative brokers because of the
lower commission offered or the alternative brokerage’s business
96
model. The effects of steering, and its efficiency in curtailing price
competition because of the importance of cooperation in the resi97
dential real estate industry, have been widely discussed. Brokers are
involved in the transaction. ASSEM. REGULATED PROFESSIONS COMM., STATEMENT TO
ASSEMBLY, NO. 373 WITH COMMITTEE AMENDMENTS, 213th Leg., 2008-2009 Leg. Sess., at
1–2 (N.J. 2009), available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2008/Bills/A0500/373_
S1.PDF (last visited Jan. 16, 2009).
95
Supra note 6.
96
The inter-dependant nature of the real estate industry means that steering can
have profoundly negative effects on price competition:
Commenters and participants in the real estate brokerage industry report steering behavior . . . . An example of steering would be a cooperating broker purposely failing to show his or her client a home listed
by a discount broker notwithstanding the fact that the home matches
the buyer’s stated preferences. Because listing brokers depend on cooperation from rivals, brokers have an opportunity to deter discounting by steering
buyers away from discounters’ listings. Lack of cooperation will reduce the
probability that homes listed by discounting brokers sell.
FTC / DOJ, supra note 3, at 68 (emphasis added). “[S]teering may also occur for reasons having nothing to do with the attributes of the house. . . . They also may hold
back from showing exclusive listings of those brokers (often alternative or ‘discount’
brokerage firms) who offer a less than attractive commission split.” FTC 1983, supra
note 5, at 75. “These differentials in the potential incomes of brokers who are dealing with prospective buyers appear to influence the showing patterns of such brokers. Brokers appear to steer buyers toward the house listed by the traditional, full
commission broker.” Id. at 39. “Because traditional brokers working with buyers are
usually compensated with a ‘split’ of the commission . . . the level of that split can
and has influenced their interest in showing homes. [T]here is much evidence that
traditional brokers are reluctant, or refuse, to show homes with commission splits
under 3 percent.” WOODALL & BROBECK, supra note 25, at 11.
97
FTC 1983, supra note 5, at 68. “[T]he allegations . . . appear to relate to . . .
aspects of the industry which may tend to rigidify prices—the ability of other brokers in a
community, because of the largely interdependent nature of the brokerage system, to withhold cooperation and thereby single out for harm the business of a ‘maverick.’” FTC / DOJ, supra
note 3, at 22 (emphasis added); FTC 1983, supra note 5, at 36–37 (“Individual brokers, we hypothesize, police the system by withholding cooperation in selling listings
which carry a lower than customary ‘split’ or commission. In doing so, they engage

MULLER (FINAL)

2009]

4/6/2009 11:20:59 PM

COMMENT

683

able to engage in steering because “an MLS listing gives brokers information on the commission that will be paid to the broker who
98
brings the buyer to that property.” According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), “[t]his practice potentially creates a disincentive for home sellers or their brokers to offer less than
the prevailing rate, since buyers’ brokers may show high-commission
99
properties first.” Numerous scholarly articles and government re100
ports discuss the MLS listing’s function as an aide in steering.
Steering also occurs when the commission offered to the buyer’s
broker is equivalent to what a traditional brokerage would offer. For
example, although Realmart Realty, a flat-fee MLS access firm, typically offers a commission split to the buyer’s broker similar to what
they expect from a traditional company—two to three percent—
Realmart still faces steering because of resistance to their business
101
model.
It therefore appears that brokers understand that if they

both in typical profit-maximizing . . . and also prevent a collective lowering of commissions generally.”).
Today broker A may represent a seller and broker B may represent a
buyer; tomorrow the reverse may be true. This sell-side/buy-side reversible interaction provides a concrete means whereby agents who are
the upholders of high fees can threaten to or actually discipline pricecutting rivals, even in the absence of a [sic] MLS. A high-fee-upholding
agent who has a potential buyer may threaten to or actually boycott the
listings of a price-cutting seller’s agent. Similarly, a high-fee-upholding
agent with a listing may make it difficult for a fee-cutting agent to bring
buyers to see the property. Much of this “steering” can happen without
any formal agreement among the agents to maintain high fee levels,
especially in a social climate where the importance of maintaining high
fees is frequently discussed and remarked upon in informal settings.
White, supra note 25, at 6–7.
98
GAO, supra note 23, at 1.
99
Id.
100
Essentially, the MLS listing acts as a tool which competing brokers can use to
help enforce a near-uniform commission rate and drive out discounters:
MLS listings do show how much sellers’ brokers will pay other brokers
for cooperating in a sale, according to industry participants. When
choosing among comparable homes for sale, brokers have a greater incentive—all else being equal—to first show prospective buyers homes
that offer other brokers the prevailing commission rate than homes
that offer a lower rate. Therefore, even without formal policies to
maintain uniform rates, individual brokers’ reliance on the cooperation of other brokers to bring buyers to listed properties may help
maintain a standard commission rate within a local area, at least for
buyers’ brokers.
GAO, supra note 23, at 13; see also Hahn, Litan & Gurman, supra note 62, at 96; Bruce
M. Owen, Kickbacks, Specialization, Price Fixing, and Efficiency in Residential Real Estate
Markets, 29 STAN. L. REV. 931, 948–49 (1977).
101
Ragusa Interview, supra note 34.
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sell an alternative brokerage’s listing, they would be giving incentives
to other sellers to list their homes with an alternative broker. Thus,
by avoiding alternative brokerages’ listings on the buyer side, traditional brokers are attempting to avoid price competition on the seller
102
side.
Besides anecdotal evidence of steering’s existence, there is also
quantitative support. In the FTC’s much-cited 1983 report, its survey
found that in their first year of operations, fifty-nine percent of responding alternative brokers suffered “frequent” refusals to show
their listings by competing brokers, while ninety percent were faced
103
The discrimination also continued
with at least sporadic refusals.
past the first year, as fifty percent of the alternative brokers continued
104
to face “frequent” refusals after several years in the industry.
The effects of steering were made even clearer in New Jersey
105
with the recent bankruptcy of Foxtons, a former leader in the New
106
Foxtons’s business model failed
Jersey discount real estate market.
largely because traditional brokers steered clients away from Foxtons’s low commission listings. As explained by a competing broker:
“I predicted this would happen a year and change ago,” Marten
said. Marten said the fees Foxtons paid brokers—which she said
at times was [sic] as low as 1 percent to 1 1/2 percent—did not
entice independent brokers or brokers who worked for other
agencies to show homes listed by Foxtons. “I saw them finally go
up to 2 percent, but their listings were languishing,” Marten said.
“The broker was only going to get 1 or 2 percent. There wasn’t a
107
lot of interest in showing their houses.”

102

The fact that most brokerages serve both buyers and sellers further complicates any effort to stifle steering:
White noted any given broker operates on both the buyer and seller
side of transactions and frequently interacts cooperatively with competitors in these transactions. “This sell-side/buy-side reversible interaction provides a concrete means whereby agents who are upholders of
high fees can threaten to or actually discipline price-cutting rivals, even
in the absence of a [sic] MLS.”
Hawker, supra note 7, at 19.
103
FTC 1983, supra note 5, at 75.
104
Id. at 75–76.
105
Diamond, supra note 32.
106
Foxtons had a major market share in New York and New Jersey, and at the time
of their bankruptcy, they had 4400 listings in these two states. Id.
107
James Bernstein, Foxtons May File for Bankruptcy, NEWSDAY, Sept. 27, 2007
(online article on file with author). A similar attitude towards Foxtons’ listings was
displayed by a Montclair broker who claimed that she and other brokers were refusing to show Foxtons’ listings because of their commission structure and business
model. Glenn Roberts Jr., Realtors Slash Commission Splits With Discounter: Foxtons Com-
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A. Steering Raises Ethical and Legal Issues Because of its Negative
Effect on Price Competition and Because It Directly Contravenes the
Broker’s Fiduciary Duty
The practice of steering raises both ethical and legal questions.
Why should a broker not have the right to forgo dealing with a certain company because he believes his services are worth more than
the commission offered? The simple answer to the ethical aspect of
this question is that through stifling price competition, steering increases transaction costs and thereby hurts the consumer. Steering
also raises serious legal questions about the broker breaking his fiduciary duties to his client.
As to the issue of price competition, cooperation from fellow
108
brokers is necessary for a real estate brokerage to have any success.
If brokers refuse to cooperate with an alternative brokerage and fail
to show its listings, they may run that broker out of the market, and
109
This results in higher
thus stymie potential price competition.
transaction costs for consumers. Even the NJREC, which has taken a
110
hands-off approach to steering, noted the importance of price
competition in a 2005 advisory letter regarding discriminatory com111
mission splits: “Licensees may not discriminate or retaliate against a
licensee who takes listings at lower commission rates . . . . Prohibiting
retaliation against brokers who are taking listings at lower commission rates promotes competition, which results in lower commission
112
fees to consumers.”
Perhaps even more importantly, those brokers who surreptitiously engage in steering breach their fiduciary duties to their cli-

plains About Perceived Unfair Practices, INMAN NEWS, June 8, 2005 (online article on file
with author).
108
GAO, supra note 23, at 13 (“A discount broker may advertise a lower commission rate to attract listings, but the broker’s success in selling those homes, and in attracting additional listings . . . depends in part on other brokers’ willingness to cooperate (by showing the homes to prospective buyers) in the sale of those listings.”).
109
See generally Braswell & Poe, supra note 53, at 317 n.244 (“Evidence indicates
that it is much easier for discount brokers to obtain property listings than it is for
them to sell the properties (as compared to traditional brokers); this discrepancy has
been attributed to the practice of steering by traditional brokers.”).
110
See infra note 149 and accompanying text.
111
For the regulation on discriminatory commission splits, see N.J. ADMIN. CODE §
11:5-7.6 (2004).
112
Letter from The N.J. Real Estate Comm’n to all Real Estate Licensees, School
Directors, Instructors and Other Interested Parties 1–2 (Nov. 29, 2005), available at
http://www.state.nj.us/dobi/division_rec/recadvisory051130.pdf [hereinafter Letter].
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113

ents.
An agent is supposed to put the interests of his principal
above all others, including his own. As the Supreme Court of New
Jersey has stated, “[t]he broker was and is looked upon as a fiduciary
and is required to exercise fidelity, good faith and primary devotion to
the interests of his principal. He cannot permit his interests to interfere with
114
Brokers are in a unique position to influence
those of his principal.”
the behavior of their clients, as they have the ability to “restrict[] the
flow of information and thus reduce[] the consumer’s access to the
115
market.” Therefore, “transactions that might interest the consumer
116
may never come to the consumer’s attention.”
By choosing not to
show a home that otherwise meets the buyer’s needs simply because
the broker believes the commission offered to him is too low, that
broker is putting his own interests above those of his client, thereby
117
In that same vein, the
breaching the fiduciary duty of loyalty.
NJREC’s language regarding discriminatory commission splits could
easily be applied to steering: “any discriminatory action . . . may, in
particular factual circumstances, also constitute a violation of a licensee’s fiduciary obligations to protect and promote the interests of his
118
client.”
B. Enforcement of Breaches of the Broker’s Fiduciary Duty Will
Effectively Stifle Steering
The fiduciary relationship between a broker and his client demands that a more effective campaign be waged against steering; but
113

FTC / DOJ, supra note 3, at 61 n.299 (“Avoiding fee-for-service listings without
disclosure to buyers, however, may raise issues concerning the fulfillment of fiduciary
duties”).
In some states, real estate agents collude to boycott homes that are being sold by agents who provide commission discounts. This practice is a
clear breach of the fiduciary duty of the agent to find the best home at
the lowest price for clients. Instead, the brokers are in effect finding
homes for their clients that will afford them the highest fee structure.
Editorial, The Realtor Racket, WALL ST. J., Aug. 12, 2005, at A8.
114
Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 236 A.2d 843, 856 (N.J. 1967) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
115
FTC 1983, supra note 5, at 75.
116
Id. “Given the position of brokers as intermediaries between the buyers and
the housing market, brokers can substantially influence the search behavior of the
buyers.” Id. at 38.
117
Such behavior would also appear to run afoul of the high ideals set forth in the
Preamble of the REALTOR® Code of Ethics and Standards of Practice, “The term
REALTOR® has come to connote competency, fairness, and high integrity resulting
from adherence to a lofty ideal of moral conduct in business relations. No inducement
of profit and no instruction from clients ever can justify departure from this ideal.”
CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 67, at pmbl. (emphasis added).
118
Letter, supra note 112, at 2.
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that is a difficult proposition. Antitrust laws may be used, generally,
when multiple groups of brokers collude to avoid showing alternative
119
A group boycott involves “‘concerted action
brokerages’ listings.
with a purpose either to exclude a person or group from the market,
120
or to accomplish some other anti-competitive object, or both.’”
That being said, proving collusion in the residential real estate indus121
try is highly difficult. Steering is a “particularly difficult behavior to
root out [and] [b]ecause residential real estate sales generally require collaboration between competing firms, back-room deals aren’t
necessary to artificially prop up prices. [Instead,] [p]eer pressure
and a modest grass-roots whisper campaign are generally enough to
122
keep agents in line.” Because of this environment, it is very difficult
to show that the brokers’ actions are part of a “concerted refusal to
123
124
deal” rather than a non-actionable “unilateral refusal to deal.”
With group boycotts being hard to prove in the residential real estate
industry, a unilateral refusal to deal could also be actionable under
125
antitrust laws, but it would likely be an unsuccessful battle.
119

FTC / DOJ, supra note 3, at 69 (“It is well established that the antitrust laws
prohibit an unreasonable agreement by a group of brokers that they will withhold
cooperation from a particular broker.”).
120
Bruce D. Greenberg & Gary K. Wolinetz, 25 Years of New Jersey Antitrust, 26
SETON HALL L. REV. 637, 650 (1996) (quoting Fuentes v. South Hills Cardiology, 946
F.2d 196, 202 (3d Cir. 1991)).
121
See Hawker, supra note 7, at 19 (“[A] high-price agent can steer buyers away
from properties listed by discounters, and this ‘can happen without any formal
agreement among the agents to maintain high fee levels, especially in a social climate
where the importance of maintaining high fees is frequently discussed and remarked
upon in informal settings.’”).
122
Jon Birger, The 4 ½% Solution, MONEY, Oct. 1, 2004, available at http://money.
cnn.com/magazines/moneymag/moneymag_archive/2004/10/01/8186561/index.
htm; see White, supra note 25, at 16–17.
123
Braswell & Poe, supra note 53, at 320 (stating that cases brought by alternative
brokers against local boards of REALTORS® or MLS organizations have been unsuccessful because the courts have concluded that the discriminatory treatment inflicted
upon the alternative brokers was the result of the unilateral conduct of some brokerages, “rather than by a concerted refusal to deal”).
124
Erxleben, supra note 25, at 199 (“Even given the strong, interdependent culture of the industry and the history of reprisals against brokers who break industry
competitive norms, a member broker’s avoidance of alternative brokers’ listings may still be
characterized as an individual unilateral refusal to deal, rather than actionable concerted
conduct.”) (emphasis added).
125
Proving that the offender had the necessary market power to sustain this type
of cause of action would be near impossible in the residential real estate industry:
Such a plaintiff could also bring an action against the MLS or the local
board under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Under this section, an individual, unilateral refusal to deal may be grounds for an antitrust violation if the plaintiff can prove that the defendant has enough control
in the market to conclude that it has monopoly power, and if the re-
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The group boycott requirement illuminates that antitrust laws
generally become ineffective when unilateral decisions are made by
126
individual brokers not to deal with an alternative brokerage.
Therefore, greater state action is needed to reduce the effects of
steering. That state action can be premised on the breach of fiduciary duty which occurs when a broker surreptitiously steers his buyer
away from a property that would otherwise be appropriate for the
broker’s own self-interested reasons, such as the low commission offered on the property or the desire not to work with an alternative
127
broker.
C. Steering Is a Breach of the Broker’s Fiduciary Duties of Loyalty and
Disclosure
The fiduciary duties of brokers in New Jersey are governed by
128
129
code and case law.
Four types of agency/non-agency relationships are recognized in New Jersey: sellers’ agency, buyers’ agency,
130
disclosed dual agency, and transaction brokerage.
This Comment
analyzes fiduciary duties in the context of buyers’ agency, as it is in
this relationship that a broker who engages in steering breaches his
duties of loyalty and disclosure to the buyer.
fusal to deal is motivated by an intention to acquire or maintain monopoly power. Very few recent cases based on this theory have been successful,
however, because courts rarely have found adequate proof that the defendant
possessed the requisite market power.
Braswell & Poe, supra note 53, at 321 (emphasis added).
126
FTC / DOJ, supra note 3, at 66–67 (“The antitrust laws generally do not require
firms to cooperate with their competitors.”); see DAVID BARRY, NINE PILLARS OF THE
CITADEL: A REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE FED. TRADE COMM’N / U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE
WORKSHOP ON COMPETITION POLICY AND THE REAL ESTATE INDUS. 57 (Nov. 2005) (citing United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919)), available at http://www.
usdoj.gov/atr/public/workshops/rewcom/213351.pdf (explaining that, absent a
group boycott, the Colgate doctrine allows individual brokers to choose not to deal
with alternative brokerages without running afoul of antitrust laws).
127
FTC / DOJ, supra note 3, at 61 n.299 (“Avoiding fee-for-service listings without
disclosure to buyers, however, may raise issues concerning the fulfillment of fiduciary
duties[.]”).
128
N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 11:5-6.4(a) (2004) (“All licensees . . . shall strictly comply
with the laws of agency and the principles governing fiduciary relationships. . . .
[T]he licensee pledges himself to protect and promote, as he would his own, the interests of
the client or principal . . . this obligation of absolute fidelity to the client’s or principal’s
interest is primary . . . .”) (emphasis added).
129
Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 236 A.2d 843, 856 (N.J. 1967) (“The broker
was and is looked upon as a fiduciary and is required to exercise fidelity, good faith
and primary devotion to the interests of his principal. He cannot permit his interests
to interfere with those of his principal. . . . He must show perfect good faith and
openness of dealing.”) (citations omitted).
130
N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 11:5-6.9(h) (2004).
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The New Jersey Administrative Code § 11:5-6.9(h) explains that
the broker’s fiduciary duties to his buyer “include reasonable care,
131
undivided loyalty, confidentiality and full disclosure.”
Similar duties are delineated both in the standard form “exclusive buyer
132
agency” contract promulgated by NJAR®, and within the NAR
133
Code of Ethics and Standards of Practice.
Steering is a breach of the broker’s fiduciary duties of “undi134
vided loyalty” and “full disclosure” to the buyer, and a breach of the
duty “to protect and promote, as he would his own, the interests of
135
the client or principal he has undertaken to represent.”
By engaging in steering, a broker may also be breaching the duties set forth in
the aforementioned exclusive buyer agency contract, which states
136
that the buyer’s agent shall “represent [b]uyer’s best interests.”
The duty of loyalty requires the subordination of the broker’s
137
personal interests to those of the client.
To comply with that duty,
the broker must make the client aware of all homes that are within
the client’s price range and that meet the specific requirements set
forth by the client—such as neighborhood, number of bedrooms, lot
size, and other metrics—regardless of the identity of the listing bro138
ker. If, without disclosing, a broker fails to show the client a property which meets the client’s needs simply because of the broker’s
own self-interest—the potential for earning a larger commission by
selling a different home—the broker is breaching the duty of loyalty
by putting his own interests above those of his client. Also, when a
broker surreptitiously engages in steering without disclosing his actions to his client, he is in breach of his duty of full disclosure.
131

Id.
NEW JERSEY ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS®, STANDARD FORM OF EXCLUSIVE BUYER
AGENCY AGREEMENT (2001).
133
CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 67, at Duties to Clients and Customers Art. I
(“When representing a buyer . . . REALTORS® pledge themselves to protect and promote the interests of their client. This obligation to the client is primary . . . .”).
134
N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 11:5-6.9(h) (2004).
135
Id. § 11:5-6.4(a).
136
NEW JERSEY ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS®, supra note 132.
137
Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 236 A.2d 843, 856 (N.J. 1967) (“The broker
. . . is required to exercise . . . primary devotion to the interests of his principal. He
cannot permit his interests to interfere with those of his principal.”) (citations omitted).
138
On the other hand, if the broker discloses his desire not to show the listings of
an alternative broker to his client, and the client agrees to the practice, then there is
no breach of fiduciary duty. For example, a New Jersey broker informed her clients
that she would not be showing them homes listed by Foxtons because she disapproved of its business model, leaving them the option of viewing the Foxtons listings
with another broker. Roberts, supra note 107.
132
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D. A Multi-Faceted Approach Is Needed to Combat Steering, Including
Increasing Consumer Awareness and Expanding Regulatory
Enforcement
Tackling the problem of steering in New Jersey requires a multifaceted approach. The first goal must be to better inform the consumer of the existence of steering and the ways it can be combated.
This is achievable through some relatively minor code changes and a
public awareness campaign. First, information on steering must be
imparted to buyers before they begin the home search with their
broker. Buyers should be encouraged to research available homes—
139
by using the internet and visiting desired neighborhoods—prior to
hiring a broker. This message could be disseminated to prospective
buyers through limited advertising in real estate publications and a
public awareness campaign, consisting of editorial letters to local
140
newspapers and appearances on local television programming.
Reaching buyers before they meet with a broker is of particular importance because when buyers perform research in preparation for
their visit with a broker, they reduce their reliance on the broker’s
141
superior knowledge of the inventory of available homes. Using this
approach, a buyer will go into a brokerage knowing which specific
homes he wants to visit, making it more difficult for the broker to en142
gage in steering.

139

For the effects of the internet on the residential real estate industry and steering, see FTC / DOJ, supra note 3, at 70 (“Going forward, the Internet offers consumers increased knowledge of homes available for sale and, consequently, may limit the
ability of cooperating brokers to steer buyers away from desirable homes listed by
discount and fee-for-service brokers.”); Hawker, supra note 7, at 16–17 (“[A]ccess to
MLS data over the Internet is shifting more of the search function to buyers as well as
making buyers and sellers ‘more knowledgeable about local comparisons with price,
location, schools, etc.’”).
140
The NJREC’s Executive Director, Assistant Director, or President of the Real
Estate Commissioners should author the editorial letters. The television appearances
could also be made by one or more of these individuals. See generally N.J. ADMIN.
CODE § 11:5-1.3 (2004) (organization chart for the NJREC). That being said, since
the functions of the NJREC as described in section 11:5-1.3 do not include public
awareness campaigns, this may be best accomplished through a joint project done in
conjunction with the Office of the Attorney General, Division of Consumer Affairs.
New Jersey Division of Consumer Affairs, http://www.state.nj.us/lps/ca/home.htm
(last visited Nov. 5, 2008).
141
FTC / DOJ, supra note 3, at 27 (“[B]rokers can take advantage of their superior
knowledge of market conditions by steering clients away from home listings that otherwise match the criteria identified by the consumers, but provide lower financial
gains for the broker than other homes.”).
142
See FTC / DOJ, supra note 3, at 28 (“[B]uyers’ increasing use of the Internet
may limit brokers’ ability to steer buyers away from discounters’ listings without their
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The informational approach to increased consumer awareness
should continue when buyers enter a broker’s office. A “Warning
Signs of Steering” poster—similar to the Fair Housing poster that is
143
currently required —should be mandated for the walls of every bro144
Also, a description of steering should be included in the
kerage.
Consumer Information Statement—a pamphlet which is required to
145
be shown to clients before the agency relationship begins.
Finally,
buyers should again be made aware of steering before they submit an
offer on a home by requiring that brokers provide a steering memorandum to buyers at contract-signing, similar to the required Attor146
ney General’s memorandum on the Law Against Discrimination.
The broker should be required to have the client read the memorandum prior to signing the contract.
Another component of the informational approach should be to
attempt to stop steering at its source by making a discussion on steering a mandatory component of the real estate salesperson training
147
For those salespersons and
course and the broker training course.
knowledge. . . . If a [buyer] finds a discounter’s listing . . . a broker likely will either
have to show the [buyer] the discounter’s listing or explain why he or she will not.”).
143
N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 13:8-1.3 (2004); EDITH LANK & JOAN M. SOBECK, ESSENTIALS
OF NEW JERSEY REAL ESTATE 56 (9th ed. 2006).
144
That poster should provide a brief, clear definition of steering, a suggestion
that buyers do their own research of the available homes within the desired community, and the recommendation that buyers ask their broker whether they are being
shown all of the homes that meet their specifications. The poster should conclude
with an instruction that buyers should report steering behavior to the NJREC. Part
of the text could read:
WARNING: Are you being shown all available homes? Some brokers
engage in a practice called steering, where they fail to show buyers
homes that meet their needs because the compensation being offered
by the seller’s broker is lower than the standard rate. Make sure you do
not fall victim to this practice. Research the homes available in your
desired neighborhood through internet searches and visits to the area.
Ask your broker whether you are being shown all available homes that
meet your specifications. An informed buyer will be a satisfied homeowner.
145
N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 11:5-6.9(e)(1)(i) (2004). The steering description in the
Consumer Information Statement could echo the text of the “Warning Signs of
Steering” poster. Supra note 144.
146
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-1 (West 2002); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 11:5-6.4(j) (2004).
The memorandum should contain a text similar to the “Warning Signs of Steering”
poster (described in note 144), and should also say that steering is a breach of the
broker’s fiduciary duty to the buyer, and that such behavior should be reported to
the NJREC. See supra note 144.
147
For the required subject matter of the salesperson and broker courses, see N.J.
ADMIN. CODE § 11:5-2.1(f),(g) (2004). The Code currently requires that twelve of the
seventy five hour salesperson’s course be devoted to “[t]he laws of agency[.]” Id. §
11:5-2.1(f). This Comment suggests that a mandatory requirement of at least a one
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brokers that are already licensed, the NJREC should draft and disseminate an advisory letter describing steering, its negative effects on
both consumers and competition within the industry, how it is a
breach of the fiduciary duty owed to the buyer, and how the NJREC
will vigorously investigate and punish those licensees who engage in
the practice.
Finally, breaches of the broker’s fiduciary duty must be enforced. In New Jersey, there has been a lack of state action in enforcing the broker’s fiduciary duty in relation to steering. The NJREC’s
website indicates few recent enforcement actions based on § 11:5148
149
This lack of regulatory en6.4, none of which relate to steering.
forcement is not limited to New Jersey, and was cited in a Wall Street
Journal editorial which said that “[t]o our knowledge, neither the National Association of Realtors nor the state real estate commissions
have ever sanctioned a real estate agent for [anti-competitive behav150
ior].” This is unacceptable.
The NJREC must take a proactive approach to combating steer151
152
ing.
Because the NJREC has investigative powers, one method
hour discussion on steering and how it is a breach of the salesperson’s fiduciary duties be included within the twelve hour agency discussion requirement. Similarly, for
the broker course, this Comment suggests at least a one hour discussion on steering
be included within the thirty hour course on ethics and agency law, particularly
within the section of the course that deals with “[t]he fiduciary duties owed by agents
to their principals.” Id. § 11:5-2.1(g)(6)(i).
148
See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
149
NJ Real Estate Commission—Disciplinary Actions, http://www.state.nj.us/dobi
/division_rec/recdiscp.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2008) (since 1999, only twenty-four
actions have been based on section 11:5-6.4 and none appear related to steering).
150
Editorial, The Realtor Racket, WALL ST. J., Aug. 12, 2005, at A8 (cited in
WOODALL & BROBECK, supra note 25, at 16).
151
Woodall and Brobeck similarly call for greater action by state regulators to “intervene fairly in cases of anti-competitive actions against nontraditional brokers[.]”
WOODALL & BROBECK, supra note 25, at 18. One clear explanation for why the NJREC
has not taken greater steps to stop steering is that the majority of its members are
themselves brokers. See About the Real Estate Commission, http://www.state.nj.us/
dobi/division_rec/reabout.html#REHearingsCommMembers (last visited Nov. 5,
2008). Woodall and Brobeck have shown that state regulators throughout the country, on the whole, have been very unsupportive of alternative brokerages. WOODALL
& BROBECK, supra note 25, at 16–17. While this author believes that the NJREC
would act against steering if it was given more resources and enough pressure was
applied on it by the public, the federal government, and the other two branches of
New Jersey’s state government, others may wish to read Nine Pillars of the Citadel,
which advocates for a more aggressive approach to ending steering: federal creation
of a national MLS system which fully exposes commission information to buyers and
sellers. Barry, supra note 126, at 63.
152
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:15-16.41(f) (West Supp. 2007) (“The commission may . . .
[m]ake any necessary public or private investigations within or outside of this State to
determine whether any person has violated or is about to violate any provision of this
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that could be effective is to begin random steering inspections. Such
a program could be similar to the Fair Housing inspections that are
153
currently performed in New Jersey by the Division on Civil Rights
154
and private enforcement groups, in which testers are utilized to see
155
if brokerages are complying with Fair Housing laws. In these steering inspections, the NJREC could use investigators posing as prospective buyers to see if brokers are steering buyers away from alternative
brokerages’ listings despite their instructions to see all available
homes in a specific price range or area of town. Finally, to add some
teeth to its enforcement measures, the NJREC should use the breach
of the broker’s fiduciary duty as a rationale for fining, suspending, or
156
revoking the licenses of those brokers that engage in steering.
V. CONCLUSION
New Jersey needs an increased level of price competition among
brokers to reduce transaction costs associated with buying and selling
a home. The best way to achieve price competition is through changing the legal and regulatory environment to encourage the growth of
alternative brokerages. Three changes are necessary to accomplish
this goal. First, the Legislature must pass A373 and legalize consumer
rebates. Second, the NJREC should adopt a number of new measures
act, or to aid in the enforcement of this act or in the prescribing of rules and regulations and forms hereunder”); see id. § 45:15-17 (further describing the extent of the
NJREC’s investigative powers); see also N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 11:5-1.1 (2004) (“The Real
Estate Commission is responsible for . . . the investigation and adjudication of disciplinary actions against licensees . . . .”).
153
Some examples of New Jersey Law Against Discrimination actions where testers
took part include: Press Release, N.J. Dep’t of Law & Public Safety, Division on Civil
Rights Files Housing Discrimination Complaints (June 23, 2003), http://nj.gov/lps/
newsreleases03/pr20030623a.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2008); Press Release, N.J.
Dep’t of Law & Public Safety, Attorney General Announces Findings of Probable
Cause in Housing Case (Feb. 15, 2007), http://www.nj.gov/oag/newsreleases07/
pr20070215a.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2008).
154
Fair Housing Council of Northern New Jersey, http://www.fhcnnj.org/
index.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2008).
155
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that testers have standing.
Public Law Research Institute, Investigatory Testing as a Tool for Enforcing Civil
Rights Statutes, http://w3.uchastings.edu/plri/spring98/testing.html (citing Havens
Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982)) (last visited Nov. 5, 2008). Similarly,
“tester” standing is allowed in the New Jersey courts. T.L. v. Toys R Us, Inc., 605 A.2d
1125, 1146 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) (Skillman, J.A.D., dissenting) (“For example, in Polk v. Cherry Hill Apartments, Inc. . . . we held that black ‘testers’ could pursue a claim for unlawful discrimination in the rental of apartments even though
they had no actual intent to rent an apartment.”) (citation omitted). See generally
LANK & SOBECK, supra note 143, at 62.
156
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:15-17 (West Supp. 2007) (provides the punishment that
the NJREC may levy against a broker).
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to increase consumer awareness of the anti-competitive practice of
steering. Third, the NJREC needs to proactively investigate steering
and punish those brokers who behave anti-competitively. If New Jersey adopts this framework, the increased price competition sparked
by the changes would allow home buyers and sellers across the state
to save substantial amounts on commission costs.

